This paper documents and assesses emerging efforts to resist and subvert deep-seated and long-held governmental secrecy over geographical spaces of military/security activities and other sites deemed sensitive by the state. It explores tensions in new web-served mapping and high-resolution imagery of these sites, which view them though 'pin holes' of publicly available data. These 'counter-mappings' focus attention on the significance of sites that are either buried unnoticed in seamless global image coverage, or else censored on official mapping. Some reveal a strongly anti-hegemonic and oppositional discourse, others a more playful set of cultural practices. We situate these newly witnessed secret sites in contemporary visual culture, exploring the spectacular and Debordian possibilities of resistance that they offer, and evaluate the significance and ironies of these diverse imaging practices.
Introduction
"Secrecy has become integrated into (no longer expelled from) the spectacle; forming a spectacular secrecy… This spectacular form generalizes secrecy into public and private domain, making revelation no longer the end to secrecy, but its new catalyst" (Bratich 2007: 42) .
Secrets are strongly associated with visual culture: they are hidden but may be revealed; ubiquitous, but often unseen and are particularly associated with certain spaces. This paper focuses upon the role of overhead imagery in the contestation of sites deemed secret by nation states.
2 Secret spaces cover a wide range of sites including a panoply of military installations, sites relating to state security, policing and prisons, strategic national assets and infrastructures (particularly nuclear facilities). These are often hidden to some degree from civil society, and protected by legislation, as well as being separated by high fences and patrolling guards. All nation states operate systems to protect their security, and many of these systems depend upon keeping critical information relating to location and internal layout hidden, from citizens or outsiders, who might threaten the hegemony of those who rule. Woodward (2005) for example draws attention to the ways in which military activities are ubiquitous but unseen in the fabric and processes of everyday British life. In the post 9/11 world perceived geopolitical 'threats' have strongly encouraged many states further to restrict information in the public domain, and also to try to use technology in more efficient ways of controlling their citizens and outsiders. Secrecy is now ubiquitous in global culture (Birchall, 2007) . But these same technologies of control also allow the formerly secret to be seen for the first time by civil society, and notions of being secret or open are complex and contested.
This article focuses upon the tensions represented in the witnessing of these secret sites, by assessing the significance of different kinds of counter-hegemonic imaging of these places through high-resolution satellite imagery delivered on the Web. Tensions around national security, freedom of information, confidentiality, neo-liberal accumulation, regulation, technology and representation are mapped out and contested in this process. Here we investigate the interface between strategic deployment of visual technologies of mapping, aerial photography and, in particular, high-resolution satellite imagery that have traditionally concerned geographers. Our argument starts by exploring the customary and exclusive 'official' uses of mapping and overhead imagery, and their theorization as strategic and rational tools of governance. Tropes of mapping for social control are, we argue, being increasingly destabilized, and part of this process has been encouraged by the increasing availability and dissemination of high-resolution imagery over the World Wide Web. We argue, however, that a more complex reading of secrecy is needed to understand this process and then illustrate counter-hegemonic re-imaging of what was formerly secret, in a comparative case study of three contrasting Web sites, exploring the contextual differences, how these relate to Guy Debord's (1998) notions of 'spectacular secrecy' and to changes in what might be deemed 'secret' in western society. 3 Seeing casts a particular power: it reveals the hidden, conveys precision and offers control to the observing eye. An elevated vision can appear to be a 'view from nowhere' (Haraway, 1988) and overhead satellite imagery as media have been closely associated with scientific and managerial approaches to the world (Parks, 2001; Robbins, 2003) . Connotations of a naturalistic objectivity and transparency flow from the use of these visual technologies: the aesthetic of abstraction and remoteness connotes the image as a document of truth, and hides the political work the image is employed to achieve. Military and state strategic interests derive much of their power from this naturalizing surveillant capacity that denies the humanity of landscapes seen. However, regarding these images from space as neutral, mirrorlike 'views from nowhere' has been shown to be deeply naïve. As Wood (1992) insightfully details imagery is no less neutral than the culturally tainted map text. Images are embedded in situated, cultural contexts, (see for example the very different roles played by imagery in the other articles in this theme issue).
Seeing as control
The militaristic logic of state institutions such as the police, state security and intelligence services rests in large part on their ability to render spaces and subjects visible, without the surveilled knowing when or why they are being watched. The success of this strategy rests, in large part, upon exclusive control of these data. In the history of modernism, mapping technologies are acknowledged as the militaristic gaze par excellence because of their ability to survey extensive areas and render complex landscapes into standardized, fixed, addressable and knowable visual symbols (Pickles, 2004) . For example, large scale national topographic surveys commissioned throughout Europe from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and extended to European colonies were established primarily to help military forces to maintain state control over territory. State mapping agencies almost all trace their origins to military needs and the cartographic specifications underlying most contemporary national 'framework' geospatial data-sets are derived from the needs of war fighting (Parry and Perkins, 2000) . Many advances in cartographic technologies in the twentieth century were driven by the need to extend the range and diversity of this military visual capacity (Day et al., 1998; Monmonier, 2002) . For example, the Global Positioning Systems were initially developed to facilitate more accurate targeting of weapon systems and is still under the command of the U.S. military, and it has also been argued that the development of GIS has been strongly influenced by military investment during the Cold War (Cloud, 2002) .
The technologies that are most significant for our argument here, however, concern the collection of visual data, and stem from developments in photogrammetry and remote 4 sensing. Indeed, the scope of visibility over space granted by conventional cartographic representations has in many senses been surpassed over the last fifty years by the availability of aerial photography and satellite monitoring. Such remotely sensed data have seen progressive increases in spatial and temporal resolution, and they form a critical part of the military 'surveillant assemblage' (Harris, 2006; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) . The specification of the original Landsat satellite sensors were driven by military needs (Mack, 1990) , military spy satellites amassed huge quantities of 'secret' imagery during the cold war era (Richelson, 1998) , and geospatial surveillance systems form an essential part of the armoury of security agencies in the 'war against terror' (e.g., Beck, 2003) . Imagery was used to build evidential pictures to support the case for the Iraq war, and offered significant support for the prosecution of the campaign and for the political justification of the action (Richelson, 2003) . Subsequent security applications include identifying possible sites of nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea. Unsurprisingly the largest demand for commercially available highresolution imagery is from military and intelligence agencies in countries without their own spy satellites (Dehqanzada and Florini, 2000) .
So the 'best' mapping and imagery, in terms of coverage, scale, positional accuracy and currency, has been, and often still is, the exclusive preserve of the military, and the strategic advantages this brings have been jealously guarded by those in power.
The political impact of high-resolution satellite imagery
Whilst much research has focused on the role of mapping, imagery and GIS in participatory democracy, truly anti-hegemonic counter-mapping, able to challenge power relations by highlighting social inequalities, has grown apace in the last twenty years (Harris and Hazen, 2005) . Published maps embody a practical and rhetorical power to articulate alternatives.
These alternative mappings can be used to re-frame the world in the service of progressive interests and challenge inequality. They have been used to reaffirm the rights of indigenous peoples; argue local cases in resource struggles; confront globalisation and multinational power; encourage community involvement in sustainable lifestyles; re-assert the role of the past in contemporary contexts; or celebrate the aesthetic and local in an age apparently dominated by uniform and mechanized production and global style. Cartographic power has also been exploited to counter dominant corporate discourses, using the authority of the map against itself. It can be argued that changing technologies of representation, and especially shifts in the resolution and availability of high-resolution satellite image data are facilitating these 'counter-maps '. 5 Many aspects of national government and corporate activity appeared to operate in a more transparent fashion in the new international political structures that emerged in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The demands of international trading and trans-national interactions in a globalizing world drove calls for more open government and greater corporate social responsibility. Florini (1998: 53) argues that "the world is embracing new standards of conduct, enforced not by surveillance and coercion but by wilful disclosure: regulation by revelation". International bodies and NGOs audit press freedom in different countries, 'score' corporate ethics and environmental conduct, and tabulate government corruption. Meanwhile an increasing number of governments enacted freedom of information legislation (Banisar, 2004) .
A small, but significant, element in these new mechanisms of more open governance stems from the apparent transparency offered by commercially-available high-resolution satellite imaging (Baker et al., 2001) . Some commentators argue the unprecedented spatial detail, currency and availability of these data create the possibilities of almost utopian change with more equal, democratic access to overhead vision in which "[n]onstate actors will be able to peer behind the walls of national sovereignty, accelerating a shift in power that is already under way" (Dehqanzada and Florini, 2000: v) . And Baker and Williamson (2006: 4) note the rise of what they term 'imagery activism' by NGOs, academics researchers and the news media that "help focus domestic and international attention on problematic issues such as environmental degradation, international security and human rights abuses in closed societies."
It is undoubtedly true the pictorial value from high-resolution satellite imagery has advantages above the topographic map, particularly in communicating to the general public. The photographic quality of imagery data means familiar features are instantly recognisable and the image exudes an apparent naturalness. In many respects images also have an aesthetic appeal above the abstraction and functional austerity of topographic mapping. Because of these affectual qualities (see Kwan, 2007) , the context in which images are released, deployed and presented is crucial. The politics behind which images are used, and how they are interpreted alters their rhetorical force.
In the years since the end of the Cold War there has been a significant switch from detailed satellite imagery that was previously secret and exclusive preserve of military-intelligence, to 6 a much more global and commercial environment (Rao and Murthy, 2006) . By 2007 thirteen different countries had mid-to-high resolution optical systems in orbit and by the end of the decade there will be twenty-one (Stoney, 2008) . The commercial market is currently led by Space Imaging's Ikonos and DigitalGlobe's Quickbird satellite platforms, providing imagery at sub-metre resolution. The next generation satellite imaging platforms will yield even more detailed and sophisticated visual evidence. Commercial interests increasingly sell data into the public sphere. Livingston and Robinson (2003) argue that state regulation of high-resolution imagery is already impossible given the diffusion of the technology beyond the confines of U.S. legal jurisdiction and military power. The mass-market access to data from these systems is increasingly dominated by web portals such as Google Earth, which serves imagery in virtual globes. Multi-national corporations like Google are subverting military hegemony over global scale mapping and imagery.
An increasing range of actors is now able to deploy imagery, for example in disaster relief, managing refugees, supporting peacekeeping missions, protecting human rights, or monitoring compliance with international treaties (cf. Baker et al., 2001; Baker and Williamson, 2006; Dehqanzada and Florini, 2000) . Television news networks also increasingly employ satellite imagery and with its combination of aesthetic appeal and apparent transparency it is seen as a powerful tool in the battle for audience ratings. The harbinger of this kind of media exploitation preceded the end of the Cold War with the Chernobyl accident in 1986 being a key moment. Analysts in the White House may have had access to spy satellite images of the disaster, but the media also sought 'visual proof' of events. Journalists saw the news value of satellite imagery and succeeded in gaining access to commercially available images (Dehqanzada and Florini, 2000) . The blurry ten-metre resolution SPOT image shown on ABC News on 1 May 1986 just days after the Whitehouse viewed the damaged reactor with their 15 cm resolution KH-11 images may have been crude and hard to interpret, but it showed the evidential power of the technology.
Whilst independently sourced, verified and interpreted satellite imagery has the power to puncture state propaganda and shift public opinion, the context in which it is produced, released and read is crucial. Parks' (2001) analysis of the use of satellite images of Srebrenica in 1995, during the Bosnian conflict, shows how the officially-released U.S. military images of mass graves revealed much more than just location. The U.S. military delayed releasing the images until after the event, as part of a strategy of deception, which embodied a careful 'oversight' of the massacres as part of a distancing strategy. The only large-scale images 7 released in the conflict 'revealed' the mass execution of Muslims, and served to condemn Serb aggression, whilst justifying the lack of action to prevent the massacre. The television news anchors described the images as evidence, but complex narration and graphics was used to 'ground the orbital gaze'. Parks argues, therefore, for a witnessing process in which the use of satellite imagery must inevitably be questioned and in which the abstraction, construction and politics of the image is revealed. Detailed satellite images are ideal for television reporting because they purport to be able to 'show' the audience the reality of news: in practice the satellite view is disembodied, partial and clearly positioned. These data appear seductively complete but complete oversight masks variable data quality and makes it hard to recognise individual sites. Also it must be remembered that commercial and technological forces for greater access are in tension with security concerns and the apparent binary divide between what might be seen as publicly available, and what might be secret becomes crucial. A commonly accepted definition of secrecy sees it as the practice of selectively sharing information, but at the same time hiding it from certain groups. Of course this simple definition ignores the context in which the term operates: a personal secret carries connotations of intimacy and privacy, whereas something which a government keeps secret focuses attention to a much greater degree on the power of secretion. In this official context secrecy becomes the obverse of publicity, demonized by many who value open government, and carrying many negative connotations: a box that should be opened. Legal mechanisms are required for keeping secrets, and power needs to be exercised to regulate what can circulate in the public realm (Ku, 1998) . So any campaign for increased openness, for publicity, becomes a political struggle. Censoring of information is the mechanism by which the box is kept shut -state agencies, the mass media, civil and religious groups and private corporations all engage in processes of revealing or concealing information, suppressing or deleting material that they deem to be sensitive, harmful to their agenda, or merely embarrassing to people in power. Maintaining secrecy frequently involves hindering access to information that might threaten hegemonic power. For example, hiding the geographical location of a site or activity 8 makes it harder for oppositional forces to contest or argue about the reasons for its existence.
Secrecy and spectacle
Secrecy itself has a strategic spatial power.
The visual representation, or the hidden visual representation of the secret is rather different from other aspects of secretion, and is best understood in the light of a cultural understanding of the role of visual practices (Rogoff, 2000) . The visual carries different connotations to the linguistic, and mapping and imagery themselves are read in very specific ways, as icons of fact, standing for disembodied objectivity. In the world of military and state security, regimes of secrecy relating to spatial information are required to hide this 'objective' information so that it becomes un-verifiable for those who do not have access to it. This has conventionally been achieved by cloaking military mapping and intelligence data gathering with national security blankets. There are many strategies for keeping the cloak on: product specifications for mapping or imagery may elide whole categories of information, and freely available public imagery almost always only displays visible wavelengths, whilst official access exploits data available across a much wider range of the electro-magnetic spectrum; information is guarded and classified (military satellite imagery is kept under wraps); maps and images in the public domain omit 'secret' detail; information is deliberately falsified, or obfuscated; or the existence of mapping as a whole is denied.
Revealing the secret has been cast by some as a kind of situated and 'reverse-panoptical' discourse, in which the taken-for-granted neutral power of satellite imagery, aerial photography and mapping is deployed against the very forces that were instrumental in it original deployment (see Natsios and Young, 2001 for a consideration of this concept).
Regimes of state-mandated cartographic secrecy are as old as the nation state itself. Harley (1989) shows how the Casa de la Contración maintained the Padron Real in the early sixteenth century as a secret master map to protect the key discoveries of Spanish explorers.
In warfare mapping is a closely guarded secret, deployed as a weapon to clarify the fog of war for friendly forces, but also as an obfuscatory tool to confuse the enemy. From Napoleonic battle plans, to secret trench maps of the First World War and now in the so-called 'war against terror', military strategy is played out through mapping or deceptively hidden from the cartographic gaze.
A wide range of intentional and deliberate 'silences' on civilian maps is most associated with totalitarian paranoia (e.g., Postnikov's, 2002 , study of cartographic deceptions in the Soviet 9 Union). However, these 'silencing' practices are not limited to closed states. Throughout the Cold War military bases, nuclear and civil defence infrastructure and security installations were absent from large-scale topographic maps in a number of liberal democracies, including Ordnance Survey mapping in Britain (see Hodson, 1999: 157-168) . Aerial photographic coverage of sensitive sites was also frequently only held in the military and secret domain, or else doctored to hide what were deemed to be sensitive detail (Board, 1991) . Withholding of information, in part so as not to unduly alarm the general public about the consequences of a nuclear attack, also served to cover extravagant expenditure (Hennessy, 2003) . Secret sites were located in remote places, hidden behind fences and anything that saw inside the fences was restricted.
The growing deployment of remotely sensed imagery in digital geospatial data has also been subject to the dictates of official secrecy, and considerable attention is being paid to maintaining geospatial database security (see for example Chun and Atluri, 2008) . The availability of commercially available data described in the previous section challenges military operational security: an enemy can now acquire data on the international market that might, arguably, compromise military action. For example, in 2006 Iraqi insurgents reportedly used Google Earth to 'spy' on British bases in Basra (Harding, 2007) , leading to Google 'censoring' its own data by substituting outdated imagery of the area (Haines, 2007) .
Security agencies in many countries seek to influence the content of publicly available images. In the aftermath of 9/11 there was a growing fear about the security of military sites and other 'critical national infrastructures' that lead to calls to limit the open distribution of detailed geospatial data. Late in 2001 the U.S. Department of Defense purchased exclusive rights to Space Imaging's Ikonos coverage of the early phases of the war in Afghanistan in an attempt to maintain control over the public policy debate (Livingston and Robinson, 2003) . Some U.S. Federal Agencies withdrew mapping that was formerly in the public domain (Zellmer, 2004) . Data formerly readily served from websites in the USA were suddenly no longer available, strategic buildings were no longer visible on the MapQuest aerial photo database (Monmonier, 2005) . Despite subsequent recognition that very few data sets pose significant threats, the balance between social benefits of freedom of information and the demands of 'homeland security' had shifted. There is now a wider definition of 'sensitive sites', including infrastructure networks, water supply systems and nuclear power stations and continuing restrictions on some data (Tombs, 2005) . 10 It is tempting to read these restrictions as a rearguard action in the face of technological change and as a response to the 'New Normal' in a world destabilised by economic instability, terrorism and global fears of contagion 1 . However secrecy is a complex social construct, with connotations well beyond notions of just 'keeping the box shut', and well beyond a simplistic opposition between being secret or open. Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 286-290) argue secrecy may indeed be seen as a container, but is also a series of actions and perceptions. It is a social process. Dean (2002:10) also argues that "[t]he actual contents of any secret are therefore immaterial. The secret is a form that can be filled in by all sorts of contents and fantasies -economic secrets, military secrets, sexual secrets, secrets to power, wealth, and immortality. Thus what is at stake is not content but connection, the relationship within and between communities held together and apart within a matrix of secrecy and publicity". There are persuasive arguments for this social reading of the construct, which are particularly richly developed in the work of Debord (1998) who argues for the notion of 'spectacular secrecy' as characterising contemporary social life. Spectacular secrecy comprises an increasingly visible culture of secrecy, in which the secret becomes an everyday practice, necessary for the successful operation of consumer capitalism and state control. Debord (1998: 12) argues that what he terms "generalised secrecy" stands behind the spectacle of contemporary society, which he believes represents "the decisive complement of all it displays and, in the last analysis, as its most important operation".
So an obsession with secrecy as a box to be opened, and as the dark side of publicity, distracts us from the necessarily hybrid nature of both, from the ubiquity of rumour, conspiracy, leaks, spins, influences, and from what Bratich (2006: 494) identifies as "a whole host of agents trained in promoting spectacular secrecy". Developing this argument Bratich (2006: 498) suggests that secrecy has become so ubiquitous that "we see not just an increase in public secrets, but an increasing monopoly over secretion or generalized secrecy". For Bratich (2006) , official disclosure becomes a kind of strategy for managing public perception, instead of a democratic discourse. Secrets are everywhere, and even when they are revealed secrecy remain a powerful force.
The strategic nature of secrecy, however, reveals how other social forces can also deploy its power. Secrecy can itself be re-circulated; oppositional forces and dissidents can deploy secrecy to invent new safeguards and refuges, and different securities from those defined by the state. Resistance itself can take the form of making new secrets (Bratich, 2007) . New 11 modes of access to high-resolution satellite imagery can set out their own newly secret knowledge. Technological change facilitates this shift of secrecy from the shadows into the spotlight. The Internet as medium is significant because of its apparent ability to 'superempower' individuals and small groups to reach across scales and connect with mass audiences, and as such is playing an important role in the dissemination and sharing of alternative mapping. There is strong evidence that the Web is enabling rapid circulation of images and their interpretation, often unmediated by hegemonic forces of the state or large corporations. This democratisation of access can impact on powerful institutions that prefer to work hidden from public view. The emancipatory potential of the Internet as a site for globalising local resistance has, however, been a source of significant debate over the last decade (e.g., Warf and Grimes, 1997; Pickerill, 2006) . The military and state securityintelligence apparatus, in particular, continuously struggle to deflect scrutiny and even more so since 9/11. From the activities of satellite watchers who share technical information about satellite orbits and track evidence of their paths (Keefe, 2006) ; to the 'leakage' of photographs The satellite image may also be re-imagined and subverted. Imagery may be used in artistic works: to reassert the beauty of abstracted landscapes, or to problematise the apparently allknowing nature of satellite-based surveillance and reveal the bodily practices denied in the objectified military image (see Biemann, 2002; Litfin, 1997) . Like other counter-maps these reworkings of remotely sensed imagery often only offer limited visual enhancements to existing imagery. It is through techniques of highlighting, juxtaposition, labelling and linking to other sources that a different political message is communicated. The remainder of this article focuses attention on three contrasting 'counter-imaging' projects that use the Web to deliver focused and annotated access to high-resolution satellite imagery and in so doing reveal some of the secret spaces of the state. We argue however, contra Natsios and Young (2001) that these projects are apposite examples of spectacular secrecy in the way their very existence depends upon the culture of secrecy, in the way they create new kinds of secret knowledge and in the ambivalent and varying politics of resistance that is embodied in their use of imagery.
Revealing the secret site: case studies
Systematic counter-mapping projects offer a contrasting view onto government secrecy, rendering hidden military bases and security installations visible once more. The following case studies are chosen to reveal the clearly situated nature of these oppositional (re)viewings, and highlight the need to view much more than just the image. These three web sites each deploy existing remotely sensed imagery, but focus the viewer's attention onto specific sites, instead of simply serving a global coverage. Each targets sites that are available on image and map sources in the public domain, drawing attention to the existence of particular facilities.
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They also juxtapose the image to other media, inviting critique of official secrecy. We would argue following Wood (2008) that a map or image is always read in the light of its immediate context. Table 1 summarises some of the relevant attributes of the context of these countermapping projects: they differ in motivation, institutional context, and content; they map different numbers and kinds of site, with varying geographic and temporal emphases; they also depict sites at different spatial scales and deploy imagery from different sources; the level of interpretation associated with the imagery, the extend of cross referencing, and outside linking and usability also varies. We develop this contextual reading below, describing the significance of each project, before evaluating their cultural impact and relating them to changing conceptions of secrecy. We argue they each in different ways may be understood as illustrating the play of spectacular secrecy (Debord, 1998) .
Eyeball Series
Architects John Young and Deborah Natsios are activists and anti-secrecy archivists run the Cryptome web site. Cryptome is "an archive of spatial and geographic documents on privacy, cryptography, dual-use technologies, national security and intelligence --communicated by imagery systems: cartography, photography, photogrammetry, steganography, climatography, seismography, geography, camouflage, maps, images, drawings, charts, diagrams, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and their reverse-panopticon and counter-deception potential"
(http://cryptome.org/other-stuff.htm). Cryptome is an important node in the network of websites concerned with freedom of information, challenging powerful interests particularly in the areas of surveillance technologies, digital rights and cryptography 3 . It serves as an antisecrecy web-based archive, and has been described as the world's most dangerous web site (Cook, 2007) .
Embedded in the site is an ongoing project consisting of a series of individual 'eyeballing' Web pages, each of which focuses on views of a particular 'sensitive site'. The political agenda in creating 'eyeballs' is to show people the places that the powerful do not want the rest of the community to see (Cook, 2007) . The mapping of facilities related to America's continued maintenance of weapons of mass destruction, for example, was released here long before Google chose to serve high resolution imagery, and highlights the hypocrisy of the Bush Government in relation to nuclear non-proliferation. The Eyeballing project is dedicated to revealing the murky workings of powerful organisations that wish to operate hidden away from public scrutiny. It complements the rest of the largely textual Cryptome archive. 
Secret Bases
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The British government has a long-standing reputation for excessive secrecy (cf. great fun by using the Internet research tools to search for 'secret sites'" 5 .
Public Eye
Public Eye is an initiative developed in the mid 1990s by policy analyst John Pike. Since 2000 this initiative has been part of GlobalSecurity.org, which now markets itself over the Web as "the leading source of background information and developing news stories in the fields of defense space, intelligence, WMD and homeland security" (<www.globalsecurity.org/org/overview/history.htm>). Like the Eyeball Series it draws upon image sources in the public domain to reveal hitherto unknown information to wider civil society. Pike's remit, however differs from John Young's. His concern is to increase the capacity of the non-governmental community to influence debates. The aim is to compile complete coverage of all weapon-related secret sites, with historical and contemporary image data and site profiles. As a one-stop web-served source of security data, the site has become very much part of the system that it documents, rather than serving as a critical outsider.
Pike first employed declassified cold war CORONA imagery, together with declassified U2 aerial imagery, USGS aerial coverage and topographic quadrangles, or JOG graphics, alongside coarser resolution SPOT, and Landsat imagery to provide context around the larger sites. From 2000 onwards Russian imagery became available from Terraserver, along with Space Imaging's IKONOS data and subsequently Quickbird imagery from Digital Globe. The most appropriate sources are used rather than following a standard pattern (see Figure 3) .
In The content is disseminated free to air, but commercial adverts are juxtaposed with imagery.
In stark contrast to the Eyeball Series the impression is of a slick, fast, commercial Web environment. Harris (2005: 18) argues that Pike's work is best understood as part of a realist narrative of transparency which provides "both the narrative structure and the technodiscursive anchor for satellite imagery systems in the social and cultural mindset".
Globalsecurity.org situates imagery into a narrative aimed at news organizations, existing, former and potential members of the military, defense contractors, congressional staff, academics, students and the wider public. The Web presence is tailored to five different target audiences: subject matter experts, senior leaders, junior staff and interns, concerned citizens 18 and news reporters. The emphasis of this market is mainly American. The site serves 500 000 page views each day and only 20% of the 2.5 million monthly visitors are repeat users.
So Public Eye is embedded in a Web site with a much more mainstream and commercial agenda -whose remit is to provide quick access to breaking stories, and background reference material in multi-mediated format. For the organisation to thrive and grow it must be authoritative and appear neutral, but for this to happen advertising revenue must flow.
Whatever story is high on the news agenda is featured by Pike. Whilst American bases feature in the site, (and very strongly in the WMD section) the weapons programmes of North Korea, Pakistan, Israel and Iran are of equal concern. Coverage is impressively global. The aim is better policy and more open government, rather than critique alone.
Conclusions
Clearly all these projects seek to question state secrecy but their impact on public consciousness and government agencies is less clear. They all provide a new vision that stimulates the imagination and hints at more than can actually been seen, making the viewer feel somehow illicit in looking straight down onto some of the most secure and sensitive places on earth. They give a thrill at seeing things we are 'not meant to see', that are for authorised eyes only. They all trade on spectacular secrecy: were the sites they depict not in some way secret then the rationale for these web projects would be lost. The maps and imagery are entirely conventional, legal and publicly available and the subversive feeling is created through the focused selection and unconventional arrangement of maps, images, interpretation and commentary. Each project targets the secret sites, but this targeting would have no purpose were the sites fully open to public scrutiny. So any analysis of their significance has to recognise the ambivalent nature of the process of revealing secrets.
The matter-of-fact reality of much of the visual and cartographic information presented in these projects is useful to challenge the myths that grow around secrecy. The Eyeball Series in particular helps to 'ground' otherwise murky, anonymous and deliberately intimidating institutions, when one can see that they inhabit ordinary office buildings, in a beltway sprawl around Washington D.C. for example (see Natsios, 2005 , for a consideration of the opaque post 9/11 national security apparatus in Washington DC). It begins to reel them back into our everyday reality from some kind of X-Files fringe (Dodge, 2003) . So this kind of mapping dissolves mystery, trading on Haraway's (1988) disembodied view from nowhere, but also invites a questioning of the power of the unannounced infrastructure around us. A similar 19 affect is produced by the very different style on Secret Bases: here a more satirical and lighthearted style pokes fun at the absurdities of official secrecy. But the affect of the different projects also reveals something of their owners: a seriously paranoid tone emerges from the Eyeballing project web site as well as from interviews with John Young (Cook, 2007) . A tone that is very much at home in the world of spectacular secrecy of the New Normal, where everything has the potential to be covered up, and where discovering conspiracy and clandestine activity has become a matter of everyday practice (Bratich, 2006) .
Even very detailed maps and images, however, can only tell us so much. These projects are working within the constraints of available public spatial data sources, which are often partial and out of date. Military analysts almost certainly work with data that are more current and fit to purpose. They can commission new scenes to be archived, or employ experts to use sophisticated image analysis software to extract patterns from the visual complexity of a scene. In contrast public data sets may lack essential metadata. The Eyeball Series and Secret
Bases are hampered by this dating problem. Also image resolution varies across the globe: of the case studies only the policy analysts consistently acquire dated, high-resolution imagery 6 .
The apparent availability of formally secret data may then simply hide a more sophisticated mechanism for preserving secrecy, with access to these inferior data being tolerated, in order to maintain military and state control over the superior and secret resolutions. Revealing new secrets simply leads to other new secrets being maintained (Debord, 1998) . paradoxical consequence is that all the case studies present a strangely atomised view of a secret world of isolated sites. They focus attention on a specific placing of secrecy, rather than its ubiquity. Debordian spectacular and general secrecy dictates their existence (Bratich, 2006 (Bratich, , 2007 , but their style denies anything beyond their immediate concerns. Nor can the interconnections, flows and chains of command, vital to the working of many hidden places, be observed in static images of facilities. By focusing on containers not practices these sites tend to replicate the notion that space can be seen and understood as a set of structures such as fences, buildings, or fixed marks on a map, rather than a set of social practices that are performed in particular places to beckon spaces into being. All three projects therefore tend to reinforce the view of secrecy as the dark opposite of publicity, at the same time as they also make newly secret knowledge. Aerial photographs, topographic maps and satellite imagery can only hint at the nature of power, they cannot actually show us power relationships. Florini (1998: 60) observes that for secret sites "[t]ransparency reveals behavior, but not intent." The visual media deployed on these sites offer only a limited gaze into the multi-sensory world of spectacular secrecy. In practice secrecy is experienced, and practiced as a process; secrets are diffused by hearing gossip, by talk, and by embodied action as well as by simply seeing the site. Seeing a disembodied image on a screen only reveals a part of the secret world.
Each of the projects uses visual technologies to reveal secrecy, and so each mainly resorts to a strongly dehumanised and distanced view. They replicate the 'god trick', and perhaps reinforce the importance of an objectivist, surveillant geographical imaginary, instead of offering a more embodied alternative. Places are mostly mapped without people or feelings.
The Eyeball Series does seek to personalise secrecy, by focusing on individuals' roles in the production of secret power and (for some stories) including photographs of individuals, in a 'bricolage' of different media (see Figure 5 ). Secret Bases also sometimes personalizes the practice of spying, but rarely the practices or feelings of people in the sites themselves. A more artistic critique such as that offered by Paglen (2006) is less likely to be tainted by the power of the gaze.
Moreover, organisations with something really worth hiding often put their most sensitive sites fully underground. Maps and images showing access roads and entrance portals to bunker complexes only give the barest hint of their subterranean extent. Also nowadays much of the secret work of the military and intelligence community is actually transacted in cyberspace, in the data networks, servers and webs of encrypted information flows, which are completely invisible to conventional cartographic display of physical facilities. With the growing recognition that detailed vision is no longer restricted it is likely there will be more attempts to conceal secret sites, as more people realise the capability of satellite observation.
Nor should we be naïve about the critique offered in the case studies. The visual medium may imply evidential transparency, but selection, interpretation and context reveal the very positioned and largely unaccountable nature of the critique. Florini (1998: 61) argues NGOs and activists are "unelected, unaccountable, and sometimes less transparent than the institutions they monitor"; nor do they offer any "guarantee of action or progressive change". to move his ISP after official pressure to remove his sites from their servers (Cook, 2007) .
The voices of the right in the U.S. clearly think sites such as the Eyeball Series threaten their agenda. In the UK Turnbull's exposure of cartographic silences is strongly compatible with recent UK-based campaigns against excessive monopoly control of spatial data, such as the Guardian Free Our Data Campaign (2007) and the latest revisions of Ordnance Survey maps are beginning to reveal formally hidden and unmapped sites (see Figure 2) . He has been invited several times by the media to comment on matters of official secrecy and has built significant contacts inside the security establishment. Once again the play of spectacular secrecy reveals complex inter-relationships between the worlds of those revealing and those charged with preserving secrecy, instead of any notion of binary opposition.
The counter-mapping case studies presented in this paper only give a 'pin-hole' view into the world of secret and sensitive sites and there are dangers exaggerating their cultural impact.
Nevertheless they clearly offer a disruptive view, and being freely distributed through the Web, it could be argued that these 'eyeballs' are potent maps of resistance to the growing secret state. They focus attention on sites that would otherwise be lost in space. We would 23 argue, however, contra Natsios and Young (2001) that they do not really reverse the panoptic tools of the watchers. Rather they form part of a much wider democratising process, offering newly secret information, part of the interplay of post 9/11 cultural politics. In an era of spectacular secrecy they offer a redistribution, rather than a reverse of secrecy, analogous to Bratich's (2006:42) observation that "…the moment of revelation did not end secrecy, but intensified and redistributed it." Indeed they show how vision is itself positioned, that the balance between secrecy and publicity is ambivalent and intensely political, and that cultural practices of knowledge production and dissemination are important in the construction of oppositional discourse. 
